

# The Motivational and Metacognitive Control in CLARION

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August 28, 2005

## **Abstract**

This article presents an overview of a relatively recent cognitive architecture, and its internal control structures, that is, its motivational and metacognitive mechanisms. The chapter starts with a look at some general ideas underlying this cognitive architecture and the relevance of these ideas to cognitive modeling of agents. It then presents a sketch of some details of the architecture and their uses in cognitive modeling of specific tasks.

Word counts: 5439

## **1 Introduction**

This article presents an overview of a relatively recent cognitive architecture, and its internal control structures (i.e., motivational and metacognitive mechanisms) in particular. We will start with a look at some general

ideas underlying this cognitive architecture and the relevance of these ideas to cognitive modeling of agents.

In the attempt to tackle a host of issues arising from computational cognitive modeling that are not adequately addressed by many other existent cognitive architectures, CLARION, a modularly structured cognitive architecture, has been developed (Sun 2002, Sun et al 2001). Overall, CLARION consists of a number of functional subsystems (for example, the action-centered subsystem, the metacognitive subsystem, and the motivational subsystem). It also has a dual representational structure — implicit and explicit representations being in two separate components in each subsystem. Thus far, CLARION has been successful in capturing a variety of cognitive processes in a variety of task domains based on this division of modules (Sun et al 2002).

A key assumption of CLARION, which has been argued for amply before (see Sun et al 2001, Sun 2002), is the dichotomy of implicit and explicit cognition. Generally speaking, implicit processes are less accessible and more “holistic”, while explicit processes are more accessible and more crisp (Reber 1989, Sun 2002). This dichotomy is closely related to some other well-known dichotomies in cognitive science: the dichotomy of symbolic versus subsymbolic processing, the dichotomy of conceptual versus subconceptual processing, and so on (Sun 1994). The dichotomy can be justified psychologically, by the voluminous empirical studies of implicit and explicit learning, implicit and explicit memory, implicit and explicit perception, and so on (Reber 1989, Seger 1994, Cleeremans et al 1998, Sun 2002).

In social psychology, there are similar dual-process models, for describing socially relevant cognitive processes (Chaiken and Trope 1999). Denoting more or less the same distinction, these dichotomies serve as justifications for the more general notions of implicit versus explicit cognition, which is the focus of CLARION. See Sun (2002) for an extensive treatment of this distinction.

Beside the above oft-reiterated point about CLARION, there are also a number of other characteristics that are especially important. For instance, one particularly pertinent characteristic of this cognitive architecture is its focus on the cognition-motivation-environment interaction. Essential motivations of an agent, its biological needs in particular, arise naturally, prior to cognition (but interact with cognition of course). Such motivations are the foundation of action and cognition. In a way, cognition is evolved to serve the essential needs of an agent. Cognition, in the process of helping to satisfy needs and following motivational forces, has to take into account environments, their regularities and structures. Thus, cognition bridges the needs and motivations of an agent and its environments (be it physical or social), thereby linking all three in a “triad” (Sun 2005).

Another important characteristic of this architecture is that multiple subsystems interact with each other constantly. In this architecture, these subsystems have to work closely with each other in order to accomplish cognitive processing. The interaction among these subsystems may include metacognitive monitoring and regulation. The architecture also includes motivational structures, and therefore the interaction also includes that be-

tween motivational structures and other subsystems. These characteristics are significantly different from other cognitive architectures such as ACT-R and Soar.

Yet another important characteristic of this cognitive architecture is that an agent may learn on its own, regardless of whether or not there is a priori or externally provided domain knowledge. Learning may proceed on a trial-and-error basis. Furthermore, through a bootstrapping process, or “bottom-up learning” as has been termed (Sun et al 2001), explicit and abstract domain knowledge may be developed, in a gradual and incremental fashion (Karmiloff-Smith 1986). This is significantly different from other cognitive architectures (e.g., Anderson and Lebiere 1998).

It should be noted that, although it addresses trial-and-error and bottom-up learning, the architecture does not exclude innate biases and innate behavioral propensities from being represented within the architecture. Innate biases and propensities may be represented, implicitly or even explicitly, and they interact with trial-and-error and bottom-up learning, by way of constraining, guiding, and facilitating learning. In addition to bottom-up learning, top-down learning, that is, assimilation of explicit/abstract knowledge from external sources into implicit forms, is also possible in CLARION (Sun 2003).

In the remainder of this chapter, first, justifications for CLARION are presented in the next section. Then, the overall structure of CLARION is presented. Each subsystem is presented in subsequent sections. Together, these sections substantiate all of the characteristics of CLARION discussed

above. A number of prior simulations using CLARION are summarized in the section following them. Some concluding remarks then complete this chapter.

## 2 Why Model Motivational and Metacognitive Control?

It is not too far-fetched to posit that cognitive agents must meet the following criteria in their activities (among many others):

- **Sustainability:** An agent must attend to its basic needs, such as hunger and thirst. The agent must also know to avoid danger and so on (Toates 1986).
- **Purposefulness:** The action of an agent must be chosen in accordance with some criteria, instead of completely randomly (Hull 1951, Anderson and Lebiere 1998). Those criteria are related to enhancing sustainability of an agent (Toates 1986).
- **Focus:** An agent must be able to focus its activities in some ways, with respect to particular purposes. Its actions need to be consistent, persistent, and contiguous, in order to fulfill its purposes (Toates 1986). However, an agent needs to be able to give up some of its activities, temporally or permanently, when necessary (Simon 1967, Sloman 2000).
- **Adaptivity:** An agent must be able to adapt its behavior (i.e., to learn)

to improve its purposefulness, sustainability, and focus.

Within an agent, two types of control are present: the primary control of actions affecting the external environment, and the secondary (internal) control by motivational and metacognitive mechanisms. In order to meet these criteria above, motivational and meta-cognitive processes are necessary, especially to deal with issues of purpose and focus. Furthermore, to foster integrative work to counteract the tendency of fragmentation in cognitive science into narrow and isolated sub-disciplines, it is necessary to consider seriously the overall architecture of the mind that incorporates, rather than excludes, important elements such as motivations and meta-cognition. Furthermore, it is beneficial to translate into architectural terms the understanding that has been achieved of the inter-relations among cognitive, meta-cognitive, motivational, and emotional aspects of the mind (Maslow 1962, 1987, Simon 1967, Toates 1986, Weiner 1992). In so doing, we may create a more complete picture of the structuring of the mind, and an overall understanding of the interaction among cognition, motivation, meta-cognition, and so on.

Compared with other existent cognitive architectures, CLARION is unique in that it contains (1) built-in motivational constructs, and (2) built-in metacognitive constructs. These features are not commonly found in other existing cognitive architectures. Nevertheless, we believe that these features are crucial to the enterprise of cognitive architectures, as they capture important elements in the interaction between an agent and its physical and social world.

For instance, without motivational constructs, a model agent would be literally aimless. It would wonder around the world aimlessly accomplishing hardly anything. Or it would have to rely on knowledge hand coded into it, for example, regarding goals and procedures (Anderson and Lebiere 1998), in order to accomplish some relatively minor things, usually only in a controlled environment. Or it would have to rely on external “feedback” (reinforcement, reward, punishment, etc.) in order to learn. But the requirement of external feedback begs the question of how such a signal is obtained in the natural world. In contrast, with a motivational subsystem as an integral part of CLARION, it is able to generate such feedback internally and learn on that basis, without requiring a “special” external feedback signal or externally provided and hand coded a priori knowledge (Edelman 1992).

This mechanism is also important for social interaction. Each agent in a social situation carries with it its own needs, desires, and motivations. Social interaction is possible in part because agents can understand and appreciate each other’s (innate or acquired) motivational structures (Tomasello 1999, Bates et al 1992). On that basis, agents may find ways to cooperate.

Similarly, without metacognitive control, a model agent may be blindly single minded: it will not be able to flexibly and promptly adjust its own behavior. The ability of agents to reflect on, and to modify dynamically, their own behaviors is important to achieve effective behaviors in complex environments. Note also that social interaction is made possible by the (at least partially) innate ability of agents to reflect on, and to modify dynamically, their own behaviors (Tomasello 1999). The metacognitive self

monitoring and control enables agents to interact with each other and with their environments more effectively, for example, by avoiding social impasse — impasse that are created because of the radically incompatible behaviors of multiple agents (see, for example, Sun 2001). It is worth noting that such cognitive-metacognitive interaction has not yet been fully addressed by other cognitive architectures such as ACT-R or Soar (but see, e.g., Sloman 2000).

Note that the duality of representation, and the concomitant processes and mechanisms, are present in, and affect thereby, both the primary control of actions, and also the secondary control, that is, the motivational and metacognitive processes. Computational modeling may capture details of the duality of representation, in both the primary and the secondary control processes.

Furthermore, to understand computational details of motivational and meta-cognitive processes, many questions specific to the computational understanding of motivation and meta-cognition need to be asked. For example, how can the internal drives, needs, and desires of an agent be represented? Are they explicitly represented (as symbolist/logicist AI would suggest), or are they implicitly represented (in some ways)? Are they transient, or are they relatively invariant temporally? How do contexts affect their status? How do their variations affect performance? How can an agent exert control over its own cognitive processes? What factors determine such control? How is the control carried out? Is the control explicit or implicit? In the remainder of this paper, details of motivational and metacognitive processes will be developed. Computational modeling pro-

vides concrete and tangible answers to many of the questions above. That is exactly why computational modeling of motivational and metacognitive control is useful.

### 3 The Overall Architecture

CLARION is intended for capturing essential cognitive processes within an individual cognitive agent. As mentioned before, CLARION is an integrative architecture, consisting of a number of distinct subsystems, with a dual representational structure in each subsystem (implicit versus explicit representations). Its subsystems include the action-centered subsystem (the ACS), the non-action-centered subsystem (the NACS), the motivational subsystem (the MS), and the metacognitive subsystem (the MCS). See Figure 1 for a sketch of the architecture. The role of the ACS is to control actions, regardless of whether the actions are for external physical movements or internal mental operations. The role of the NACS is to maintain general knowledge, either implicit or explicit. The role of the MS is to provide underlying motivations for perception, action, and cognition, in terms of providing impetus and feedback (e.g., indicating whether outcomes are satisfactory or not). The role of the MCS is to monitor, direct, and modify the operations of the ACS dynamically as well as the operations of all the other subsystems.

Each of these interacting subsystems consists of two levels of representation (i.e., a dual representational structure): Generally, in each subsystem, the top level encodes explicit knowledge and the bottom level encodes im-

PLICIT knowledge; this distinction has been argued for earlier (see also Reber 1989, Seger 1994, and Cleeremans et al 1998). Let us consider the representational forms that need to be present for encoding these two different types of knowledge. Notice the fact that the relatively inaccessible nature of implicit knowledge may be captured by subsymbolic, distributed representation provided, for example, by a backpropagation network (Rumelhart et al 1986). This is because distributed representational units in the hidden layer(s) of a backpropagation network are capable of accomplishing computations but are subsymbolic and generally not individually meaningful (Rumelhart et al 1986, Sun 1994). This characteristic of distributed representation, which renders the representational form less accessible, accords well with the relative inaccessibility of implicit knowledge (Reber 1989, Seger 1994, Cleeremans et al 1998). In contrast, explicit knowledge may be captured in computational modeling by symbolic or localist representation (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 1993), in which each unit is more easily interpretable and has a clearer conceptual meaning. This characteristic of symbolic or localist representation captures the characteristic of explicit knowledge being more accessible and more manipulable (Sun 1994).

Accessibility here refers to the direct and immediate availability of mental content for the major operations that are responsible for, or concomitant with, consciousness, such as introspection, forming higher-order thoughts, and verbal reporting. The dichotomous difference in the representations of the two different types of knowledge leads naturally to a two-level architecture, whereby each level uses one kind of representation and captures one

corresponding type of process (implicit or explicit).

Let us now turn to learning. First, there is the learning of implicit knowledge at the bottom level. One way of implementing a mapping function to capture implicit knowledge is to use a multi-layer neural network (e.g., a three-layer backpropagation network). Adjusting parameters of this mapping function to change input/output mappings (that is, learning implicit knowledge) may be carried out in ways consistent with the nature of distributed representation (e.g., as in backpropagation networks), through trial-and-error interaction with the world. Often, reinforcement learning can be used (Sun et al 2001), especially Q-learning (Watkins 1989), implemented using backpropagation networks. In this learning setting, there is no need for a priori knowledge or external teachers providing desired input/output mappings. Such (implicit) learning may be justified cognitively. For instance, Cleeremans (1997) argued at length that implicit learning could not be captured by symbolic models but neural networks. Sun (1999) made similar arguments.

Explicit knowledge at the top level can also be learned in a variety of ways (in accordance with localist/symbolic representation used there). Because of its representational characteristics, one-shot learning (for example, based on hypothesis testing) is preferred during interaction with the world (Bruner et al 1956, Busemeyer and Myung 1992, Sun et al 2001). With such learning, an agent explores the world, and dynamically acquires representations and modifies them as needed.

The implicit knowledge already acquired in the bottom level may be

utilized in learning explicit knowledge at the top level, through *bottom-up learning* (Sun et al 2001). That is, information accumulated in the bottom level through interacting with the world is used for extracting and then refining explicit knowledge. This is a kind of “rational reconstruction” of implicit knowledge at the explicit level. Conceivably, other types of learning of explicit knowledge are also possible, such as explicit hypothesis testing without the help of the bottom level. Conversely, once explicit knowledge is established at the top level, it may be assimilated into the bottom level. This often occurs during the novice-to-expert transition in instructed learning settings (Anderson and Lebiere 1998). The assimilation process, known as *top-down learning* (as opposed to bottom-up learning), may be carried out in a variety of ways (Anderson and Lebiere 1998, Sun 2003).

Figure 1 presents a sketch of this basic architecture of a cognitive agent, which includes the four major subsystems interacting with each other. The following four sections will describe, one by one and in more detail, these four subsystems of CLARION. We will first look into the ACS, which is mostly concerned with the control of the interaction of an agent with its environment, as well as the NACS, which is also under the control of the ACS. On the basis of these two subsystems, we will then focus on the MS and the MCS, which provide another layer of (secondary) control on top of the ACS and the NACS.

## 4 The Action-Centered Subsystem

The action-centered subsystem (the ACS) of CLARION is meant to capture the action decision making of an individual cognitive agent in its interaction with the world, that is, the primary control of actions of an agent. The ACS is the most important part of CLARION. In the ACS, the process for action decision making is essentially the following: Observing the current state of the world, the two levels of processes within the ACS (implicit or explicit) make their separate decisions in accordance with their own knowledge, and their outcomes are somehow “combined”. Thus, a final selection of an action is made and the action is then performed. The action changes the world in some way. Comparing the changed state of the world with the previous state, the agent learns (in accordance with Q-learning of Watkins 1989 as mentioned earlier). The cycle then repeats itself.

In this subsystem, the bottom level is termed the IDNs (the Implicit Decision Networks), implemented with neural networks involving distributed representations, and the top level is termed the ARS (the Action Rule Store), implemented using symbolic/localist representations.

The overall algorithm for action decision making during the interaction of an agent with the world is as follows:

1. Observe the current state  $x$ .
2. Compute in the bottom level (the IDNs) the “value” of each of the possible actions ( $a_i$ 's) associated with the state  $x$ :  $Q(x, a_1), Q(x, a_2), \dots, Q(x, a_n)$ . Stochastically choose one

action according to these values.

3. Find out all the possible actions ( $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_m$ ) at the top level (the ARS), based on the the current state  $x$  (which goes up from the bottom level) and the existing rules in place at the top level. Stochastically choose one action.
4. Choose an appropriate action, by stochastically selecting the outcome of either the top level or the bottom level.
5. Perform the action, and observe the next state  $y$  and (possibly) the reinforcement  $r$ .
6. Update the bottom level in accordance with an appropriate algorithm (to be detailed later), based on the feedback information.
7. Update the top level using an appropriate algorithm (for extracting, refining, and deleting rules, to be detailed later).
8. Go back to Step 1.

The input ( $x$ ) to the bottom level consists of three sets of information: (1) sensory input, (2) working memory items, (3) the selected item of the goal structure. The sensory input is divided into a number of input dimensions, each of which has a number of possible values. The goal input is also divided into a number of dimensions. The working memory is divided into dimensions as well. Thus, input state  $x$  is represented as a set of dimension-value pairs:  $(d_1, v_1)(d_2, v_2)\dots(d_n, v_n)$ .

The output of the bottom level is the action choice. It consists of three groups of actions: working memory actions, goal actions, and external ac-

tions. <sup>1</sup>

In each network (encoding implicit knowledge), actions are selected based on their values. A Q value is an evaluation of the “quality” of an action in a given state:  $Q(x, a)$  indicates how desirable action  $a$  is in state  $x$ . At each step, given state  $x$ , the Q values of all the actions (i.e.,  $Q(x, a)$  for all  $a$ ’s) are computed. Then the Q values are used to decide probabilistically on an action to be performed, through a Boltzmann distribution of Q values:

$$p(a|x) = \frac{e^{Q(x,a)/\alpha}}{\sum_i e^{Q(x,a_i)/\alpha}} \quad (1)$$

where  $\alpha$  controls the degree of randomness (temperature) of the decision-making process. (This method is also known as Luce’s choice axiom; Watkins 1989.)

The *Q-learning* algorithm (Watkins 1989), a reinforcement learning algorithm, is used for learning implicit knowledge at the bottom level. In the algorithm,  $Q(x, a)$  estimates the maximum (discounted) total reinforcement that can be received from the current state  $x$  on. Q values are gradually tuned, on-line, through successive updating, which enables reactive sequential behavior to emerge through trial-and-error interaction with the world. Q-learning is implemented in backpropagation networks (see Sun 2003 for details).

Next, explicit knowledge at the top level (the ARS) is captured by *rules* and *chunks*. The condition of a rule, similar to the input to the bottom level, consists of three groups of information: sensory input, working memory items, and the current goal. The output of a rule, similar to the output from the bottom level, is an action choice. It may be one of the three

types: working memory actions, goal actions, and external actions. The condition of a rule constitutes a distinct entity known as a chunk; so does the conclusion of a rule.

Specifically, rules are in the following form: *state-specification*  $\longrightarrow$  *action*. The left-hand side (the condition) of a rule is a conjunction (i.e., logic AND) of individual elements. Each element refers to a dimension  $x_i$  of state  $x$ , specifying a value range, for example, in the form of  $x_i \in (v_{i1}, v_{i2}, \dots, v_{in})$ . The right-hand side (the conclusion) of a rule is an action recommendation.

The structure of a set of rules may be translated into that of a network at the top level. Each value of each state dimension (i.e., each feature) is represented by an individual node at the bottom level (all of which together constitute a distributed representation). Those bottom-level feature nodes relevant to the condition of a rule are connected to the single node at the top level representing that condition, known as a chunk node (a localist representation). When given a set of rules, a rule network can be wired up at the top level, in which conditions and conclusions of rules are represented by respective chunk nodes, and links representing rules are established that connect corresponding pairs of chunk nodes.

To capture the *bottom-up learning* process (Stanley et al 1989, Karmiloff-Smith 1996), the Rule-Extraction-Refinement algorithm (RER) learns rules at the top level using information in the bottom level. The basic idea of bottom-up learning of action-centered knowledge is as follows: If an action chosen (by the bottom level) is successful (i.e., it satisfies a certain criterion), then an explicit rule is extracted at the top level. Then, in subsequent

interactions with the world, the rule is refined by considering the outcome of applying the rule: If the outcome is successful, the condition of the rule may be generalized to make it more universal; if the outcome is not successful, then the condition of the rule should be made more specific and exclusive of the current case.

An agent needs a rational basis for making these above decisions. Numerical criteria have been devised for measuring whether a result is successful or not, used in deciding whether or not to apply these operations. The details of the numerical criteria measuring whether a result is successful or not can be found in Sun et al (2001). Essentially, at each step, an information gain measure is computed, which compares different rules. The afore-mentioned rule learning operations (extraction, generalization, and specialization) are determined and performed based on the information gain measure (see Sun 2003 for details).

On the other hand, in the opposite direction, the dual representation (implicit and explicit) in the ACS also enables *top-down learning*. With explicit knowledge (in the form of rules) in place at the top level, the bottom level learns under the guidance of the rules. That is, initially, the agent relies mostly on the rules at the top level for its action decision making. But gradually, when more and more knowledge is acquired by the bottom level through “observing” actions directed by the rules (based on the same Q-learning mechanism as described before), the agent becomes more and more reliant on the bottom level (given that the inter-level stochastic selection mechanism is adaptable). Hence, top-down learning takes place.

For the stochastic selection of the outcomes of the two levels, at each step, with probability  $P_{BL}$ , the outcome of the bottom level is used. Likewise, with probability  $P_{RER}$ , if there is at least one RER rule indicating a proper action in the current state, the outcome from that rule set (through competition based on rule utility) is used; otherwise, the outcome of the bottom level is used (which is always available). Other components may be included in a like manner. The selection probabilities may be variable, determined through a process known as “probability matching”: that is, the probability of selecting a component is determined based on the relative success ratio of that component. There exists some psychological evidence for such intermittent use of rules; see, for example, Sun et al (2001).

This subsystem has been used for simulating a variety of psychological tasks, including process control tasks in particular (Sun et al 2006). In process control tasks, participants were supposed to control a (simulated) sugar factory. The output of the sugar factory was determined by the current and past inputs from participants into the factory, often through a complex and non-salient relationship. In the ACS of CLARION, the bottom level acquired implicit knowledge (embodied by the neural network) for controlling the sugar factory, through interacting with the (simulated) sugar factory in a trial-and-error fashion. On the other hand, the top level acquired explicit action rules for controlling the sugar factory, mostly through bottom-up learning (as explained before). Different groups of participants were tested, including verbalization groups, explicit instruction groups, and explicit search groups (Sun et al 2006). Our simulation succeeded in captur-

ing the learning results of different groups of participants, mainly through adjusting one parameter that was hypothesized to correspond to the difference among these different groups (that is, the probability of relying on the bottom level; Sun et al 2006).

Besides simulating process control tasks, this subsystem has been employed in simulating a variety of other important psychological tasks, including artificial grammar learning tasks, serial reaction time tasks, Tower of Hanoi, Minefield Navigation, and so on, as well as social simulation tasks such as organizational decision making.

## 5 The Non-Action-Centered Subsystem

The non-action-centered subsystem (the NACS) is used for representing general knowledge about the world that is not action-centered, for the purpose of making inferences about the world. It stores such knowledge in a dual representational form (the same as in the ACS): that is, in the form of explicit “associative rules” (at the top level), as well as in the form of implicit “associative memory” (at the bottom level). Its operation is under the control of the ACS.

First, at the bottom level of the NACS, “associative memory” networks (AMNs for short) encode non-action-centered implicit knowledge. Associations are formed by mapping an input to an output. The regular back-propagation learning algorithm, for example, can be used to establish such associations between pairs of input and output (Rumelhart et al 1986).

On the other hand, at the top level of the NACS, a general knowledge

store (the GKS) encodes explicit non-action-centered knowledge (cf. Sun 1994). As in the ACS, chunks are specified through dimensional values. The basic form of a chunk consists of a chunk id and a set of dimension-value pairs. A node is set up in the GKS to represent a chunk (which is a localist representation). The chunk node connects to its constituting features (i.e., dimension-value pairs) represented as individual nodes in the bottom level (a distributed representation in the AMNs). Additionally, in the GKS, links between chunks encode explicit associations between pairs of chunk nodes, which are known as associative rules. Such explicit associative rules may be formed (i.e., learned) in a variety of ways in the GKS of CLARION (Sun 2003).

On top of that, similarity-based reasoning may be employed in the NACS. A known (given or inferred) chunk may be compared with another chunk. If the similarity between them is sufficiently high, then the latter chunk is inferred.

Similarity-based and rule-based reasoning can be inter-mixed. As a result of mixing similarity-based and rule-based reasoning, complex patterns of reasoning may emerge. As shown by Sun (1994), different sequences of mixed similarity-based and rule-based reasoning capture essential patterns of human everyday (mundane, commonsense) reasoning.

As in the ACS, top-down or bottom-up learning may take place in the NACS, either to extract explicit knowledge in the top level from the implicit knowledge in the bottom level, or to assimilate the explicit knowledge of the top level into the implicit knowledge in the bottom level.

The NACS of CLARION has been used to simulate a variety of psychological tasks. For example, in artificial grammar learning tasks, participants were presented with a set of letter strings. After memorizing these strings, they were asked to judge the grammaticality of new strings. Despite their lack of complete explicit knowledge about the grammar underlying the strings, they nevertheless performed well in judging new strings. Moreover, they were also able to complete partial strings in accordance with their implicit knowledge. The result showed that participants acquired fairly complete implicit knowledge although their explicit knowledge was fragmentary at best (Domangue et al 2004). In simulating this task, while the ACS was responsible for controlling the overall operation, the NACS was used for representing most of the relevant knowledge. The bottom level of the NACS acquired implicit associative knowledge that enabled it to complete partial strings. The top level of the NACS recorded explicit knowledge concerning sequences of letters in strings. When given partial strings, the bottom level or the top level might be used, or the two levels might work together, depending on circumstances. Based the above setup, our simulation succeeded in capturing fairly accurately human data in this task across a set of different circumstances (Domangue et al 2004). In addition, many other tasks have been simulated involving the NACS, including alphabetic arithmetic tasks, categorical inference tasks, discovery tasks, and so on.

## 6 The Motivational Subsystem

Now that we dealt with the primary control of actions within CLARION (through the ACS and the NACS), we are ready to explore details of motivational and metacognitive control within CLARION. In CLARION, secondary internal control processes over the operations of the ACS and the NACS are made up of two subsystems: the motivational subsystem and the metacognitive subsystem.

The motivational subsystem (the MS) is concerned with drives and their interactions (Toates 1986). That is, it is concerned with why an agent does what it does. Simply saying that an agent chooses actions to maximize gains, rewards, or payoffs leaves open the question of what determines gains, rewards, or payoffs. The relevance of the motivational subsystem to the main part of the architecture, the ACS, lies primarily in the fact that it provides the context in which the goal and the reinforcement of the ACS are determined. It thereby influences the working of the ACS, and by extension, the working of the NACS.

As an aside, for several decades, criticisms of commonly accepted models of human motivations, for example in economics, have focused on their overly narrow views regarding motivations, for example, solely in terms of simple economic reward and punishment (economic incentives and disincentives). Many critics opposed the application of this overly narrow approach to social, behavioral, cognitive, and political sciences. Complex social motivations, such as desire for reciprocation, seeking of social approval, and interest in exploration, also shape human behavior. By neglecting these

motivations, the understanding of some key social and behavioral issues (such as the effect of economic incentives on individual behavior) may be hampered. Similar criticisms may apply to work on reinforcement learning in AI (for example, Sutton and Barto 1998).

A set of major considerations that the motivational subsystem of an agent must take into account may be identified. Here is a set of considerations concerning drives as the main constructs (cf. Simon 1967, Tyrell 1993):

- *Proportional activation.* The activation of a drive should be proportional to corresponding offsets, or deficits, in related aspects (such as food or water).
- *Opportunism.* An agent needs to incorporate considerations concerning opportunities. For example, the availability of water may lead to prefer drinking water over gathering food (provided that food deficits are not too great).
- *Contiguity of actions.* There should be a tendency to continue the current action sequence, rather than switching to a different sequence, in order to avoid the overhead of switching.
- *Persistence.* Similarly, actions to satisfy a drive should persist beyond minimum satisfaction, that is, beyond a level of satisfaction barely enough to reduce the most urgent drive to be slightly below some other drives. <sup>2</sup>
- *Interruption when necessary.* However, when a more urgent drive

arises (such as “avoid-danger”), actions for a lower-priority drive (such as “get-sleep”) may be interrupted.

- *Combination of preferences.* The preferences resulting from different drives should be combined to generate a somewhat higher overall preference. Thus, a compromise candidate may be generated that is not the best for any single drive but the best in terms of the combined preference.

A bipartite system of motivational representation is as follows (cf. Simon 1967, Nerb et al 1997). The explicit goals (such as “finding food”) of an agent (which is tied to the working of the ACS, as explained before) may be generated based on internal drive states (for example, “being hungry”) of the agent. This explicit representation of goals derives from, and hinges upon, (implicit) drive states. See Figure 2. <sup>3</sup>

Specifically, we refer to as *primary drives* those drives that are essential to an agent and are most likely built-in (hard-wired) to begin with. Some sample low-level primary drives include (cf. Tyrell 1993):

**Get-food.** The strength of this drive is determined by two factors: *food deficit* felt by the agent, and the *food stimulus* perceived by it.

**Get-water.** The strength of this drive is determined by *water deficit* and *water stimulus*.

**Avoid-danger.** The strength of this drive is proportional to the danger signal: its distance, intensity, severity (disincentive

value), and certainty.

In addition, other drives include **get-sleep**, **reproduce**, and a set of “avoid saturation” drives, for example, **avoid-water-saturation** or **avoid-food-saturation**. There are also drives for **curiosity** and **avoid-boredom**. See Sun (2003) for further details.

Beyond such low-level drives (concerning physiological needs), there are also higher-level drives. Some of them are primary, in the sense of being “hard-wired”. The “need hierarchy” of Maslow (1987) identifies some of these drives. A few particularly relevant high-level drives include: **belongingness**, **esteem**, **self-actualization**, and so on (Sun 2003).

These drives may be implemented in a (pre-trained) backpropagation neural network, representing evolutionarily pre-wired instincts.

While primary drives are built-in and relatively unalterable, there are also “derived” drives. They are secondary, changeable, and acquired mostly in the process of satisfying primary drives. Derived drives may include: (1) gradually acquired drives, through “conditioning” (Hull 1951); (2) externally set drives, through externally given instructions. For example, due to the transfer of the desire to please superiors into a specific desire to conform to his/her instructions, following the instructions becomes a (derived) drive.

Explicit goals may be set based on these (primary or derived) drives, as will be explored in the next section (Simon 1967, Nerb et al 1997).

## 7 The Meta-Cognitive Subsystem

Meta-cognition refers to one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes and their outcomes. Meta-cognition also includes the active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes, usually in the service of some concrete goal (Flavell 1976, Mazzoni and Nelson 1998). This notion of metacognition is operationalized within CLARION.

In CLARION, the metacognitive subsystem (the MCS) is closely tied to the motivational subsystem. The MCS monitors, controls, and regulates cognitive processes for the sake of improving cognitive performance (Simon 1967, Sloman 2000). Control and regulation may be in the forms of setting goals for the ACS, interrupting and changing on-going processes in the ACS and the NACS, setting essential parameters of the ACS and the NACS, and so on. Control and regulation are also carried out through setting reinforcement functions for the ACS on the basis of drive states.

In this subsystem, many types of metacognitive processes are available, for different metacognitive control purposes. Among them, there are the following types (Sun 2003, Mazzoni and Nelson 1998):

(1) behavioral aiming:

setting of reinforcement functions

setting of goals

(2) information filtering:

focusing of input dimensions in the ACS

focusing of input dimensions in the NACS

(3) information acquisition:

selection of learning methods in the ACS

selection of learning methods in the NACS

(4) information utilization:

selection of reasoning methods in the ACS

selection of reasoning methods in the NACS

(5) outcome selection:

selection of output dimensions in the ACS

selection of output dimensions in the NACS

(6) cognitive mode selection:

selection of explicit processing, implicit processing, or a combination thereof (with proper integration parameters), in the ACS

(7) setting parameters of the ACS and the NACS:

setting of parameters for the IDNs

setting of parameters for the ARS

setting of parameters for the AMNs

setting of parameters for the GKS

Structurally, the MCS may be subdivided into a number of modules. The bottom level consists of the following (separate) networks: the goal setting network, the reinforcement function network, the input selection

network, the output selection network, the parameter setting network (for setting learning rates, temperatures, etc.), and so on. In a similar fashion, the rules at the top level (if they exist) can be correspondingly subdivided. See Figure 3 for a diagram of the MCS. Further details, such as monitoring buffer, reinforcement functions (from drives), goal setting (from drives), information selection, and so on, can be found in Sun (2003).

This subsystem may be pre-trained before the simulation of any particular task (to capture evolutionary pre-wired instincts, or knowledge/skills acquired from prior experience).

## 8 Simulations Conducted with CLARION

CLARION has been successful in simulating a variety of psychological tasks. These tasks include serial reaction time tasks, artificial grammar learning tasks, process control tasks, categorical inference tasks, alphabetical arithmetic tasks, and the Tower of Hanoi task (see Sun 2002). Some of these tasks have been explained earlier. In addition, extensive work has been done on a complex minefield navigation task (Sun et al 2001). We have also tackled human reasoning processes through simulating reasoning data.

Therefore, we are now in a good position to extend the effort on CLARION to the capturing of a wide range of motivational and metacognitive control phenomena. Simulations involving motivational structures and metacognitive processes are under way. For instance, in the task of Metcalfe (1986), subjects were given a story, and asked to solve the puzzle in the story. They were told to write down every 10s a number between 0 and 10, whereby 0

meant that they were “cold” about the problem and 10 meant that they were certain that they had the right solution. The general finding was that subjects who came up with the correct solution gave lower warmth ratings than did subjects with incorrect solutions. In our simulation involving the MCS, those variants of the models that generated the correct solution gave lower warmth ratings than those that generated incorrect solutions, due to the more diverse range of potential solutions they generated. Thus, the simulation model accounted for the counter-intuitive findings in the experimental data of Metcalfe (1986).

For another instance, in Gentner and Collins (1991), inferences were shown to be made based on (1) the lack of knowledge about something, and (2) the importance/significance of that knowledge. In order to make such inferences, meta-cognitive monitoring of one’s own reasoning process is necessary. However, beyond meta-cognitive monitoring (as in the previous task), active meta-cognitive intervention is also necessary. Our model was shown to be able to capture such inferences.

Let us also take a brief look at some rather preliminary applications of CLARION to social simulation, which also involve motivational and metacognitive control to some extent. In one instance, tribal societies were simulated, on the basis of CLARION modeling individual cognitive processes. In the simulation, different forms of social institutions (such as food distribution, law, political system, and enforcement of law) were investigated and related back to factors of individual cognition. The interaction of social institutions and cognition is of tremendous importance both theoret-

ically and practically (Sun 2005). Social institutions affect agents' actions and behaviors, which in turn affect social institutions. In this interaction, individual motivational factors are being taken into consideration, which include social norms, ethical values, social acceptance, empathy, imitation, and so on. The role of metacognitive control is also being investigated in this process. It has been suggested that such simulations are the best way to understand or to validate the significance of contributing cognitive, motivational, and metacognitive factors (Sun 2005).

## 9 Concluding Remarks

In summary, this article covers the essentials of the CLARION cognitive architecture, and focuses, in particular, on the motivational and metacognitive control within CLARION. CLARION is distinguished by its inclusion of multiple, interacting subsystems: the action-centered subsystem, the non-action-centered subsystem, the motivational subsystem, and the metacognitive subsystem. It is also distinguished by its focus on the separation and the interaction of implicit and explicit knowledge (in these different subsystems, respectively). With these mechanisms, especially the motivational and metacognitive mechanisms, CLARION has something unique to contribute to cognitive modeling — it attempts to capture the motivational and metacognitive aspects of cognition, and to explain their functioning in concrete computational terms.

For the full technical details of CLARION, see Sun (2003), which is available at <http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/clarion-pub.html>. CLAR-

ION has been implemented as a set of Java packages, available at  
<http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/clarion.html>.

## **Acknowledgments**

The work on CLARION has been supported in part by Army Research Institute contracts DASW01-00-K-0012 and W74V8H-04-K-0002 (to Ron Sun and Robert Mathews). The writing of this article was supported by AFOSR contract # ..... (to Wayne Gray). Thanks are due to Xi Zhang, Isaac Naveh, Paul Slusarz, Robert Mathews, and many other collaborators, current or past. Thanks are also due to Jonathan Gratch, Frank Ritter, Chris Sims, and Bill Clancey for their comments on an early draft, and to Wayne Gray for the invitation to write this article.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Note that afore-mentioned working memory is for storing information temporarily for the purpose of facilitating subsequent decision making (Baddeley 1986). Working memory actions are used either for storing an item in the working memory, or for removing an item from the working memory. Goal structures, a special case of working memory, are for storing goal information specifically.

<sup>2</sup> For example, an agent should not run toward a water source and drink only a minimum amount, and then run toward a food source and eat a minimum amount, then going back to the water source to repeat the cycle.

<sup>3</sup> Note that it is not necessarily the case that the two types of representations directly correspond to each other (e.g., one being extracted from the other), as in the case of the ACS or the NACS.

Figure Captions:

Figure 1. The CLARION architecture. ACS denotes the action-centered subsystem, NACS the non-action-centered subsystem, MS the motivational subsystem, and MCS the meta-cognitive subsystem.

Figure 2. Structure of the motivational subsystem.

Figure 3. The structure of the metacognitive subsystem.




Figure 1: The CLARION architecture. ACS denotes the action-centered subsystem, NACS the non-action-centered subsystem, MS the motivational subsystem, and MCS the meta-cognitive subsystem.




Figure 2: Structure of the motivational subsystem.

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


Figure 3: The structure of the metacognitive subsystem.